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FRAMING MIDDLE-CLASS INSECURITY:
TAX AND THE IDEOLOGY OF UNEQUAL
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Martha T. McCluskey*
INTRODUCTION
Tax law has helped make struggle, risk, and sacrifice the new normal for
the American middle class. This change in middle-class status results not
only from tax policies, but also from ideas about tax that cultivate
acquiescence in unequal austerity.1
As Lisa Philipps shows in the context of Canada, recent income tax
policies encourage middle-class citizens to rely more on their own private
family wealth and personal human capital—and less on collective public
protection—to secure middle-class expectations of access to health care,
education, income security, family, retirement, and economic opportunity.2
Yet, as Philipps explains, those tax policies of self-reliance clash with a
reality in which middle-class earnings and savings are increasingly
precarious, if not substantially out of reach. That reality of middle-class
vulnerability is even more pronounced in the United States, with more
limited public support for health care, retirement, and higher education.
This insecurity has grown even as middle-class American households
generally have taken greater responsibility for economic gain by increasing
work productivity, upgrading educational attainment, and working more
hours.3 From 1971 to 2015, U.S. household income overall has shifted
upward from middle-income to upper-tier households, leaving the middle

* Professor of Law and William J. Magavern Faculty Scholar, SUNY Buffalo Law School.
Thanks to Linda Sugin and Mary Louise Fellows for organizing the Fordham Law Review
symposium entitled We Are What We Tax and to Lisa Philipps and other participants at the
symposium for rich and inspiring discussion and comments guiding this Article. For an
overview of the symposium, see Mary Louise Fellows, Grace Heinecke & Linda Sugin,
Foreword: We Are What We Tax, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2413 (2016).
1. See generally STEVE FRASER, THE AGE OF ACQUIESCENCE: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF
AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO ORGANIZED WEALTH AND POWER (2015) (comparing current
passivity with previous eras of mass political mobilization).
2. See generally Lisa Philipps, Registered Savings Plans and the Making of MiddleClass Canada: Toward a Performative Theory of Tax Policy, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2677
(2016).
3. See LAWRENCE MISHEL, ECON. POLICY INST., VAST MAJORITY OF WAGE EARNERS
ARE WORKING HARDER, AND FOR NOT MUCH MORE: TRENDS IN U.S. WORK HOURS AND
WAGES OVER 1979–2007, at 1 (2013), http://www.epi.org/files/2013/ib348-trends-us-workhours-wages-1979-2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MK9-8H4B].
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class both smaller in size and squeezed economically.4 In 2013, upperincome families had seven times the wealth of middle-income families,
compared to three times the wealth of middle income families in 1983.5
The upper 10 percent have received an increasing share of gains from
business cycles since the 1980s compared to the bottom 90 percent of
households and all of the gains from growth during the 2000 to 2008
business cycle.6
How we think about tax shapes how we think about this new redivision
of the economic “pie.” Tax policies championing security through
individual savings do not simply promote the ideal of personal economic
responsibility for economic loss and insecurity. More insidiously, these
policies convey the message that good middle-class citizenship is about
accepting low expectations of personal economic success. The prevailing
scholarly and popular tax discourse helps rationalize increased middle-class
risk and sacrifice as an economic fact beyond politics.
This discourse largely presumes that middle-class economic power and
prosperity does not come from democratic solidarity and collective
protection. Instead, it echoes a neoliberal vision that embraces government
support as a foundation of economic success, but insists that success
depends on redirecting government support away from ordinary workers,
families, and consumers toward protecting concentrated private market
wealth as the primary engine of economic prosperity. That vision identifies
middle-class status with incapacity, insecurity, and dependency in a new
and naturally unequal economic order.
A more accurate understanding of the role of tax in the political economy
can help challenge this neoliberal reconstruction of the middle class.
Government taxing and spending is fundamental, not supplemental, to the
seemingly private market order. Tax policy inevitably operates to lead, not
just to follow or distort, the “normal” production and distribution of
economic power. Tax policy, in a democratic government, can and should
be a means for ordinary citizens to participate in constructive collective
control over economic production for their benefit.
This Article first explains how the prevailing discourse frames federal tax
support for the middle class as either consumption or redistribution, both of
which appear to be essentially unproductive and potentially destructive.
Second, this Article examines the expansion of state and local tax support
for elite private capital. In contrast to tax support favoring the middle class,
this upper-class support is accepted widely as necessary for productive
economic development. Operating below the radar of prominent tax

4. For instance, 49 percent of U.S. aggregate income went to upper-income households
in 2014, up from 29 percent in 1970. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS IS
LOSING GROUND: NO LONGER THE MAJORITY AND FALLING BEHIND FINANCIALLY 4 (2015).
5. Id. at 8.
6. Pavlina Tcherneva, What’s Wrong with David Leonhardt’s NYT Piece on
Inequality?, NEW ECON. PERSP. (Feb. 19, 2015), http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2015/
02/whats-wrong-with-david-leonhardts-nyt-piece-on-inequality.html
[https://perma.cc/
L3G5-5TTJ].
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debates, this state and local tax policy reveals more starkly and perversely
how prevailing views of tax rationalize inequality and austerity. This
Article concludes by defending the core regulatory and productive function
of the democratic tax system, grounded in the legitimate collective power of
middle- and lower-income households to make the economy more
responsible to their interests.
I. TAX AS FRUGAL SPENDING OR PROFLIGATE TAKING?
The message of middle-class subordination emerges from a conceptual
framework of tax that appears to reflect benign common sense. That frame
presents two primary functions for tax policy.7 First and foremost, taxes
raise revenue to finance public spending. This goal typically is analyzed in
terms of efficiency: the extent to which taxes raise the maximum revenue
at the least cost.8 Tax scholars widely discuss tax efficiency as a question
of objective analysis of the degree to which a given tax “distorts” what are
assumed to otherwise be normal resource-maximizing market decisions.9
Second, taxes can redistribute resources from some private interests to
others.10 This distributive goal is assumed to be a matter of contested
subjective political and moral judgments about fairness.11
Beneath its innocuous surface, this foundational division nonetheless
operates to rationalize and normalize the rising inequality and austerity for
the middle class. It presumptively locates economic productivity in a
distinct and underlying private sector, with government taxing and spending
essentially cast as derivative and dependent on gain largely generated
elsewhere. In this frame, middle-class taxpaying serves one of two primary
purposes: either consumption of government commodities or forced
charity. As discussed below, each of these alternatives casts tax support
favoring the middle class as suspect, so that this tax support appears
unreasonable unless sharply limited.
A. Middle Class Submission in Tax “Consumption”
As taxpaying consumers of public goods and services, middle-class
citizens can appear rational and responsible to the extent they curtail their
demands on the government to match their willingness to cover the costs

7. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Equity Versus Efficiency and the U.S. Tax System in
Historical Perspective, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 25, 25–70 (Joseph J.
Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002) (analyzing the shift from emphasis on
distributional equity to the goal of efficiency).
8. See Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX L.
REV. 229, 229 (2011).
9. See id. at 233 (advocating for a more complex and complete approach).
10. See Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 523, 525, 535–36 (2013) (describing taxation as a system of zero-sum
transfers in contrast to the ideal of a market bargain producing mutual gain).
11. See id. at 529–30 (explaining that conventional economic analysis claims to eschew
the contested questions of redistribution implicated in tax law).
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by paying more taxes.12 In this view, taxes—like market prices—should
help discipline middle-class citizens by inducing them to make inevitably
tough tradeoffs among competing government spending priorities to
maximize resources assumed to be naturally and necessarily scarce.13 In
this presumed consumer role, rational middle-class taxpayers should also
weigh their personal gains from government spending against the possible
personal gain from substituting private spending or savings for the cost of
the taxes needed to “buy” public goods or services.
In the current economic context, most middle-class taxpayers probably
realize that individual savings and earnings are unlikely to provide reliable
personal or family prosperity and security. Yet this realization may tend to
further discourage middle-class aspirations for “purchasing” expanded
collective government support through higher taxes. The idea of taxpaying
as consumption, for example, underlies warnings that maintaining current
levels of social security retirement benefits likely will require either high
payroll taxes on increasingly struggling younger middle-class workers, or
government debt that will reduce the security and prosperity of younger
generations due to some combination of greater taxes, reduced government
services, and dampened private economic growth.14 If government
spending for the middle class depends on middle-class taxpaying, then more
generous middle-class public support will appear largely unaffordable, or at
least difficult to achieve without resorting to irresponsible and generally
futile efforts to escape from paying the true costs of these gains. That is,
the consumer view of tax largely presents the barriers to greater middleclass security as fixed and intractable economic constraints.
B. Middle Class Submission in Tax “Redistribution”
Prevailing tax theory appears to soften and offset this gloomy message by
presenting redistribution as the alternative by which fiscal policy may
alleviate insecurity and inequality. Yet, under the surface, this seemingly
neutral alternative also subtly points toward the conclusion that substantial
gains for the middle class largely lie beyond the reach of reasonable tax
policy. Constructed as “redistribution,” progressive tax policies favoring
the middle class appear to be one-way involuntary transfers of resources
12. See, e.g., Scott Horsley, Balancing the Budget: The Problem Might Be You, NPR
(Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/16/133783606/balancing-the-budget-theproblem-might-be-you (criticizing ordinary voters for their political support for
infrastructure spending without similar support for general tax increases) [https://perma.cc/
9YSX-39YP].
13. See LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE FORM 1040: TWO CHEERS FOR THE
RETURN-BASED MASS INCOME TAX 12 (2013) (discussing arguments that the pain of
taxpaying induces citizens to carefully limit government spending); Eric M. Zolt, Politics
and Taxation: An Introduction, 67 TAX L. REV. 453, 455 (2014) (discussing the “fiscal
contract” model of taxpaying as a market-like exchange of tax revenue for government
services according to taxpayer preferences).
14. See, e.g., Romina Boccia, Social Security: $39 Billion Deficit in 2014, Insolvent by
2035, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 29, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/
07/social-security-39-billion-deficit-in-2014-insolvent-by-2035
[https://perma.cc/2E3MRDKN].
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from more economically capable taxpayers.15 That conceptualization
implicitly suggests that progressive tax policy primarily aimed at shifting
resources to the middle class from the rich will tend to make middle-class
security dependent on the unwilling support of more powerful others.
Even when that position of dependency appears normatively justified or
politically popular, it means that middle-class gains from redistributive tax
policies are likely to be relatively insecure and costly (in the long run)
compared to any gains from efficient tax policies. If we assume progressive
tax policies take private resources from wealthier taxpayers, we can expect
that these more economically powerful taxpayers are likely to respond by
diverting or decreasing their private spending and saving to accommodate,
mitigate, or resist this loss. But if middle-class economic success largely
depends on private earnings and savings, even when supplemented by
government support, then middle-class prosperity may be threatened by any
“redistribution” that disrupts or weakens the private economic activity of
those who control the largest share of the private economy.16
It is true that this logic leaves open to debate and analysis the degree of
economic risk or blowback to the middle class from any particular
redistributive tax. Nonetheless, the conceptual lens of “redistribution” casts
doubt on the wisdom of using tax policy to protect the middle class. That
lens further suggests that middle-class citizens should not trust their own
political interests or ideals of fairness as the basis for determining the
proper scope and design of tax benefits for the middle class, but instead
should defer to technical economic expertise.
In addition, the idea of redistributive taxation suggests that the presumed
disruption of otherwise normal economic forces will extend beyond private
productivity to government functioning. From the prevailing idea that taxes
extract private resources to purchase government programs, it follows that
harm to private economic productivity from “redistributive” taxes will also
risk reducing tax revenue on which government spending seemingly
depends, exacerbating the tough choices that already face middle-class tax
“consumers.” Further, in contrast to theoretically consensual reciprocal
economic exchanges, involuntary taxes aimed at helping the middle class at
the expense of wealthier others will depend on enhanced government
compulsion to achieve the intended result.17
Though, in theory, state and federal governments have plenty of force at
their disposal, in practice, tax enforcement depends on complex
administration operating under legal, political, and resource constraints.
The current context of heightened inequality gives more reason for middle-

15. See Raskolnikov, supra note 10, at 525, 535–36 (comparing tax “redistribution” to
theft and insider trading).
16. See Jim Chen, Progressive Taxation: An Aesthetic and Moral Defense, 50 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 659, 672–73 (2012) (arguing for progressive taxation despite presumed
negative economic incentive effects).
17. See Raskolnikov, supra note 10, at 541 (explaining economic arguments that
taxation as a compulsory transfer tends to induce costly resistance offsetting at least some of
the intended gains from the transfer).
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class citizens to doubt that this bureaucratic machinery will compel the rich
to hand over an increased share of resources without a hitch. Taxes
characterized as redistributive will not only appear especially politically and
economically controversial, but also will target those with the most to gain
from (and the most to spend on) manipulating, contesting, and evading
taxes.18 In their role as rational “consumers” of government spending, as
well as potential beneficiaries of tax redistribution, middle-class taxpayers
are faced with the likelihood that the costs of administering and enforcing
robust redistributive fiscal policies will come at the expense of fewer
resources for other vital government goods and services. In fact, building
on middle-class suspicions of upper-class tax avoidance, political leaders
have cultivated popular opposition to progressive income taxation on the
ground that progressivity causes complexity that leads the rich to exploit
“loopholes” at the expense of the middle class.19
Further, those with extensive wealth at stake will have reason to resist
downwardly redistributive taxes by investing in political efforts to
undermine those policies, whether by cutting resources for tax enforcement,
lobbying for offsetting tax favors, or directly funding politicians and public
intellectuals who will discredit redistributive goals, tax progressivity, and
federal government spending.20 In an electoral context dependent on
wealthy donors, successful tax initiatives aiding the middle class are likely
to be packaged with even greater tax concessions for the wealthy (or new
spending concessions affecting the middle class). For example, the 2001 to
2003 Bush Administration tax law changes giving “marriage penalty relief”
to many middle-class taxpayers also included extensive tax reductions for
the wealthy.21
Tax policies portrayed as redistributive, zero-sum transfers to the middle
class also will appear likely to increase threats to economic security from
within the middle class. Proposals for more government support for
individual health insurance, education, home ownership, or retirement, for
18. See Noam Scheiber & Patricia Cohen, For the Wealthiest, a Private Tax System That
Saves Them Billions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/30/
business/economy/for-the-wealthiest-private-tax-system-saves-them-billions.html?_r=0
(reporting how the very wealthiest Americans effectively use their private money and power
to buy tax policy) [https://perma.cc/EB72-W8C7].
19. See, e.g., Stephanie Condon, Carly Fiorina: What Does She Stand for?, CBS NEWS
(Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/media/carly-fiorina-what-does-she-stand-for/4/
(reporting that the Republican former presidential candidate promotes the idea of a simple
three-page federal income tax on the ground that the current “deductions and loopholes and
complexities actually benefit the wealthy” not the middle class) [https://perma.cc/Y4RTBPHN].
20. See generally James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 71
(Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) (analyzing how industry influences public
policy by using identity, status, and relationships to promote its interests and ideology).
21. See CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: THE 2001 AND 2003
TAX CUTS (2009) (explaining that a large share of the tax cuts from this legislation will go to
the top 1 percent of households); Martha T. McCluskey, Taxing the Family Work: Aid for
Affluent Husband Care, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 109, 190–92 (2011) (contrasting the
family tax reforms with the accompanying tax breaks for the wealthy).
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example, raise middle-class concerns that their own hard-won resources
will be tapped to benefit less resourceful others. For example, in response
to President Obama’s proposal to end some of the Bush Administration’s
tax breaks for those earning more than $250,000, University of Chicago law
professor Todd Henderson infamously blogged that this income level
unfairly extended beyond the rich because his own dual-earner family
struggled to maintain a middle-class lifestyle despite earning over that
amount.22 He withdrew his essay under harsh criticism contrasting most
Americans’ economic problems with his family’s difficulty paying for
private schools, retirement, a nanny, lawn care, and good housing.23
Nonetheless, Henderson’s concern reflects the real challenges of
depending on individual savings and earnings for family security and
prosperity, even with income much higher and more secure than that
available to the vast majority of the middle class. For example, in 2013, a
New York Times columnist warned that $1 million in family savings could
well be insufficient to sustain retirement in a middle-class lifestyle through
a ripe old age, especially in higher cost urban areas, even though 90 percent
of Americans will save far less than that—and many will save nothing at
all.24 Without a substantial expansion of public social security benefits,
almost half of all middle-class American workers will be poor or near poor
during retirement, and even many high income workers will face a
substantial drop in living standards.25
The possibility that insecurity and austerity extends far up the economic
scale further fuels popular anxiety about the harmful economic impact of
policies characterized as unproductive “redistributive” transfers. In an
economy where exceptional personal discipline and entrepreneurship
appears ever more necessary for success, “redistributive” tax policies
compensating those falling short will, by definition, reward and induce
unsuccessful economic behavior—perhaps including outright fraud and
manipulation.26 In the prevailing logic, to counter destructive incentive
effects, “redistributive” programs reasonably should impose conditions and
penalties aimed at controlling unproductive recipient behavior. For
example, the Affordable Care Act’s “individual mandate” to purchase
health insurance was designed to counteract incentives for middle-class
22. Ameet Sachdev, Earnings of More than $250,000 a Year, but Professor Laments
Family Just Getting by, CHICAGO TRIB. (Sept. 23, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
2010-09-23/business/ct-biz-0924-rich-blog-20100923_1_law-professor-blog-taxes [https://
perma.cc/9RR8-92HR].
23. Id.
24. Jeff Sommer, For Retirees, a Million-Dollar Illusion, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/your-money/why-many-retirees-could-outlive-a-1million-nest-egg.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/TX8P-3VJG].
25. Teresa Ghilarducci, Our Ridiculous Approach to Retirement, N.Y. TIMES (July 21,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/opinion/sunday/our-ridiculous-approach-toretirement.html [https://perma.cc/Y2EM-H3MF].
26. See Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the
Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 805–07, 850–51 (2003) (analyzing
economic moral hazard arguments against social welfare programs and showing how these
rest on problematic moral judgments about unequal bargaining power).
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consumers to game the system by waiting until illness before buying
insurance.27 That problem would have been solved by expanding the
popular single-payer Medicare program, but instead, the public health
coverage was designed to provide public income-based support for
purchasing private insurance.28 The resulting system of penalties and
subsidies likely contributes to confusion and suspicion that participants will
be exploited rather than protected by either government or private insurers
or both.29
Even when the regulatory measures accompanying redistributive taxation
are designed to change behavior through “carrots” rather than “sticks,”
these also tend to reinforce a message of resignation to inevitable middleclass economic insecurity and decline. Tax subsidies for individual savings
accounts for health or retirement, in theory, address concerns about the
perverse effects of redistributive subsidies by narrowly rewarding behavior
construed as productive and responsible. In practice, however, these
“carrots” tend to appear elusive and unfairly regressive, directing benefits to
a small group of relatively affluent taxpayers.30
A recent tax policy reform providing more substantial support to the
middle class is structured to reward family status rather than individual
market success. A package of laws enacted from 2001 to 2004,31 and
renewed by what was called the Middle Class Tax Relief & Job Creation
Act of 2012,32 reduced income tax rates for married middle-class couples,
excluding the highest income levels and lower-income families. These
reforms lower marital income tax rates compared to individual rates,
thereby increasing the tax benefits available from marital income splitting
in families with unequal spousal earnings, especially in more affluent

27. The “individual mandate” refers to requirements in section 1501 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 18091 and 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
28. See Sarah van Gelder, If the Health Care Mandate Is Struck Down, Single-Payer
Becomes the Best Choice, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/sarah-van-gelder/single-payer-healthcare_b_1416387.html (discussing
the constitutional challenge to the health reform legislation, which was later upheld by the
Supreme Court) [https://perma.cc/WV2E-CX5V].
29. See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL: JANUARY 2014,
at 15 (2014) (reporting substantial negative perceptions among uninsured Americans).
30. See The State of U.S. Retirement Security: Can the Middle Class Afford to Retire?
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Policy of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 30 (2014) (statement of Monique Morrissey, Economist, Econ.
Policy Inst.) (criticizing tax favored retirement accounts for subsidizing savings by highincome households rather than encouraging effective retirement savings).
31. See Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, 118 Stat. 1166
(extending the marriage penalty reforms of the Economic Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 through 2010);
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752
(accelerating those marital tax changes); Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 301, 115 Stat. 38, 3–54 (gradually expanding the 15
percent tax bracket and standard deduction for married taxpayers).
32. Pub. L. No. 112-96, 126 Stat. 156 (2012).
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middle-class families.33 This income-splitting device shelters married
breadwinners’ earnings from the higher rates that would apply if those
earnings were taxed progressively on an individual basis, providing a bonus
(compared to single earnings) to the classic breadwinning-homemaker
marital family structure. In effect, the marriage bonus subsidizes “affluent
unpaid husband care” because it operates as a selective standardized
deduction for the costs of personal household services (like cooking,
cleaning, child care, or social networking) only for families where a highearning breadwinner has potential access to those services by informal
exchange with a spouse relatively free from the demands of market
earnings.34 Though the marriage tax reforms eased previous tax penalties
on dual-earning marital families, neither those families nor single earners
have the same opportunity to shelter the substantial costs of services for
sustaining middle-class breadwinning.35
The breadwinner-homemaker marital family structure that gets this
special earnings shelter has become out of reach or precarious for most
middle-class Americans facing stagnant, unsteady, or falling wages—or
rising costs of housing, medical care, and education.36 Moreover, these
subsidies skew rewards toward the most affluent families in the targeted
income range (with a disproportionate racial impact also).37 Further, these
subsidies reward and encourage the economic insecurity of middle-class
homemaking spouses, whose family labor generally does not earn them
equal legal rights to the breadwinners’ earnings or savings.38
Though it may seem a relic of the past, this recently increased middleclass family status subsidy embraces a contemporary neoliberal logic.
Reasonable middle-class citizens must seek security not through
progressive taxing or spending (on programs such as public child care or
health insurance), but rather in private relationships of economic
dependence on discretionary gains from others, even though these
relationships are fraught with instability and inequality from common
middle-class life events like divorce, disability, career change, earnings
insecurity, and persistent household debt.
Policies construed as tax redistribution are likely to be narrowed not only
to select groups within the middle class, but also to be curtailed on the
theory that resources should be targeted to the neediest. Because
redistributive taxes are assumed to be grounded in moral or social goals, not
economic principle, these policies are likely to appear less legitimate the
more they shift resources to the middle class rather than to the poor. For
example, commentators have recently criticized federal loan support for
33. See generally McCluskey, supra note 21 (criticizing marital income-splitting
policies both before and after the reforms).
34. Id. at 202–09.
35. Id. at 117–24 (giving examples of different types of households).
36. Id. at 127–28.
37. Id. at 128–35 (summarizing findings of a number of scholars analyzing unequal
effects).
38. Id. at 204–16 (explaining how more progressive individualized taxation could more
fairly recognize homemaking services).
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graduate or professional education on the ground that this public subsidy
should only go to students likely to be especially needy or especially
humble in their economic aspirations.39
In sum, whether as responsible personal savers, efficient consumers of
government programs, or deserving beneficiaries of tax redistribution,
prevailing ideas of tax policy discourage the middle class from drawing on
public support as a reasonable solution to economic insecurity and
inequality. Nonetheless, that does not mean current tax policy constructs
private markets and personal responsibility as the key to success. Instead,
tax policy helps deliver the broader neoliberal message that a new economic
reality of harsh global competition means that prosperity depends on
enhanced government support for unequal private wealth creation. Middle
class economic well-being, in this view, necessarily depends not on hardearned private rights to personal resources or public rights to social
citizenship, but rather on discretionary, trickle-down spillovers from
superior economic players.
II. TAX AS TRIBUTE TO ELITE CAPITAL?
Compared to federal income taxes, recent major tax changes in state and
local government tax policy have received less attention in both tax
scholarship and popular politics. State and local taxation generally is
regressive, with middle-class and low-income households paying a higher
share of their income than upper-income households.40
Exacerbating this burden, over the last quarter century, increasingly
lavish tax support and public financing for elite private business has
become a defining feature of the American political economy.41 Though a
full picture of this fiscal landscape is obscured by secrecy, silence, and
decentralized data, its general contours permeate popular politics and
everyday life. Seen up close, the ray of hope for improved middle-class
prospects from these fiscal policies appears to consist of paying escalating
public tribute to elite private capital owners on the chance of receiving
private favors in return.

39. See Vinal Patel, Grad-School Debt Is Said to Rise Rapidly and Deserve More Policy
Attention, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 25, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/GradSchool-Debt-Is-Said-to/145539/ (quoting Jason Delisle’s criticism of lumping graduate and
undergraduate debt together) [https://perma.cc/8XUZ-ZAFE].
40. See INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, WHO PAYS? A DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS
OF THE TAX SYSTEMS IN ALL 50 STATES 1 (2015), http://www.itep.org/pdf/whopaysreport.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4EEL-EARX].
41. For some of the groundbreaking reports on this development, see GREG LEROY, THE
GREAT AMERICAN JOBS SCAM: CORPORATE TAX DODGING AND THE MYTH OF JOB CREATION
(2005); GREG LEROY, NO MORE CANDY STORE: STATES AND CITIES MAKING JOB SUBSIDIES
ACCOUNTABLE (1997); Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Corporate Welfare: A TIME
Investigation Uncovers How Hundreds of Companies Get on the Dole—and Why It Costs
Every Working American the Equivalent of Two Weeks Pay Every Year, TIME MAG. (Nov. 9,
1998), http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/1998/11/02/corp.welfare.htm [https://
perma.cc/A7YQ-TKV2].
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A. Public Responsibility for Unequal Private Business Support
Investigating these business incentive policies nationwide, a 2012 New
York Times report calculated that state and local governments have been
giving more than $80 billion a year in tax and spending incentives for
businesses, largely free of reciprocal obligations and often with little public
oversight or information.42 Special exemptions from income, sales, and
property taxes for businesses make up the largest portion of these
incentives.43 These incentive policies are a phenomenon of the neoliberal
era, emerging in the 1980s as local governments struggled with the decline
of middle-class manufacturing jobs and then escalating in size and number
through the 1990s and 2000s.44
The resulting subsidies have largely bypassed the small, local firms more
likely to be owned and managed by middle-class Americans.45 Major
beneficiaries of these subsidies include many of the largest corporations in
the world, such as Intel, Boeing, Microsoft, Google, Shell, IBM, Amazon,
and many Fortune 500 firms.46 Companies receiving over $1 billion in
cumulative incentives include Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway group
and Wal-Mart.47
A large portion of the business subsidies consist of high stakes gambles
pinning local economic hopes on undiversified “trophy deals.”48 In the
database produced by the New York Times investigation, from 2007 to
2012, forty-eight companies nationwide each received over $100 million in
incentives.49
Unlike private market investors, local governments not only tend to lack
sophistication and diversification in their role as venture capitalists, but also
generally forgo legal rights to significant ownership and control in

42. Louise Story, As Companies Seek Tax Deals, Governments Pay High Price, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/us/how-local-taxpayersbankroll-corporations.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/P8SY-KBDT].
43. See id. (calculating $18 billion in income tax breaks and $52 billion in sales tax
breaks out of the overall $80 billion annual incentives).
44. See PHILIP MATTERA & KASIA TARCZYNSKA, MEGADEALS: THE LARGEST ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY PACKAGES EVER AWARDED BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1–2, 7 (2013) (reporting the rise in number and size of subsidy awards
over recent decades).
45. See generally GREG LEROY ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, SHORTCHANGING SMALL
BUSINESS: HOW BIG BUSINESSES DOMINATE STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES
(2015), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/shortchanging.pdf (finding
90 percent of $3.2 billion of subsidies going to big business in a study of fourteen states)
[https://perma.cc/CP9P-QCHG].
46. See PHILIP MATTERA, GOOD JOBS FIRST, SUBSIDIZING THE CORPORATE ONE PERCENT:
SUBSIDY TRACKER 2.0 REVEALS BIG-BUSINESS DOMINANCE OF STATE AND LOCAL
DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES 4 (2014), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/
pdf/subsidizingthecorporateonepercent.pdf [https://perma.cc/55SV-QP6T].
47. See id.
48. See MATTERA & TARCZYNSKA, supra note 44, at i (reporting that the number of state
or local subsidy deals larger than $75 million has doubled since 2008).
49. Louise Story et al., $100 Million Club, N.Y. TIMES (2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2012/12/01/us/government-incentives.html#co-generalmotors [https://perma.cc/
2HG3-M32C].
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exchange for these “investments.” The tax incentives often have been made
without strong legal “clawback” provisions for enforcing promises, leaving
governments with little or no power to control the number of jobs produced,
the pay and conditions of employment, and how long the firm will stay in
the area.50 Subsidies are not typically conditioned on ongoing compliance
with environmental, labor, or consumer laws. Local governments often
lack good information about whether a given private firm would locate or
expand in their area without any subsidy.51 Similarly, local governments
often lack resources to evaluate fully threats by firms to withdraw facilities
and jobs to locations offering higher subsidies, and this asymmetry creates
incentives for deception and corruption.52 Many of the incentives do not
support new economic growth but rather directly fund the relocation of
existing businesses between states or within a state or city or even
neighborhood.53
Despite these concerns, tax policies aimed at attracting business have
persistent political appeal, rationalized on the theory that initial lost revenue
will be offset by taxes from growth in jobs and spillover economic activity.
But assuming that this expected development materializes, it is likely to put
greater burdens on local government services and infrastructure (for
example, water, sewer, garbage, roads, services, policing, and schools)
disproportionately funded by other businesses and residents not granted
special tax reductions. Those eroding services and infrastructure are
precisely what small business leaders often identify as major barriers to the
growth of middle-class enterprise.54 Though entrepreneurship is often
hailed as the new economy’s alternative to traditional employment for
middle-class success, these tax policies may help larger firms crowd out
innovative small businesses by using government support either directly to
undercut small business competitors or to subject local small-business
suppliers to tighter competition.

50. See generally PHILIP MATTERA ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, MONEY BACK GUARANTEES
FOR TAXPAYERS: CLAWBACKS AND OTHER ENFORCEMENT SAFEGUARDS IN STATE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY PROGRAMS (2012), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/
files/docs/pdf/moneyback.pdf (finding serious deficiencies nationwide in state efforts to
measure, require, and enforce performance) [https://perma.cc/S5VD-RQGS].
51. Indeed, extensive expert research has failed to substantiate claims of general
economic benefit from these subsidies, though the harmful effect on government services is
clearer. See Alan Peters & Peter Fisher, The Failures of Economic Development Incentives,
70 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 27, 32 (2004).
52. See Story et al., supra note 49 (portraying local officials as outmatched by
multinational corporations in a “high-stakes bazaar”).
53. See generally GREG LEROY ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, THE JOB-CREATION SHELL
GAME: ENDING THE WASTEFUL PRACTICE OF SUBSIDIZING COMPANIES THAT MOVE JOBS
FROM ONE STATE TO ANOTHER (2013), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/
pdf/shellgame.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SHR-XPF6].
54. See generally CAROLYN FRYBERGER ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL
PLAYING FIELD: WHAT LEADERS OF SMALL BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS THINK ABOUT
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES (2015), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/
files/docs/pdf/levelfieldreport.pdf (surveying forty-one small business owners in twenty-five
states on economic development subsidies) [https://perma.cc/M7M2-P95B].
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Nonetheless, public subsidies for large multistate and multinational firms
have become the norm, so that significant numbers of middle-class jobs and
spillover economic gains now appear to depend on the heavily subsidized
local facilities operated by large corporations. The fact that these earnings
are relatively insecure and scarce can make voters and politicians even
more willing to keep gambling for such elusive gains.
These tax development schemes generally are not the target of national
commentary advocating rationalizing taxes through careful attention to
incentive effects and net benefits. Though promoted as a crucial strategy
for creating middle-class jobs, the general lack of evidence of results and
the often shaky prospects for any lasting gain may be largely beside the
point. Even if a particular incentive deal seems to have little chance of
paying off, local support for bad deals may be rational (from the perspective
of individualized local governments) because of the likelihood that refusing
to give in to demands of existing or potential large local employers will
result in highly visible short-term losses. In local economies where middleclass jobs are eroding and tax revenue is declining, the competition among
state and local (and foreign) governments for business investment leaves
individual governments with little bargaining power in a classic race to the
bottom.
Unlike idealized market transactions, to a significant extent these tax
deals operate as extortion: a one-way transfer paid by a weaker economic
agent to induce a more powerful counterparty to refrain from imposing even
greater unequal economic harm. On the more powerful side of the bargain,
some corporate executives nonetheless express doubts about the long-term
value of orienting business competition toward extracting ever-greater and
more innovative (including corrupt) forms of public tax support.55 Business
leaders claim they are forced to play the game under their legal obligation
to maximize short-term gains for shareholders.56 For example, one leader
of a local business group noted that his city’s lavish but largely futile
subsidy wars made him “sick.”57 Acknowledging the pressure driving his
own participation, this business leader added, “It sounds like I’m talking
myself out of a job, but there ought to be a law against what I am doing.”58
B. Middle-Class Responsibility for Fiscal Austerity
In this mass shakedown, middle-class and poor citizens generally end up
financing business subsidies at the expense of their own economic
opportunity and security. Many government services and benefits that are
especially valuable for the middle class (such as education, infrastructure,
and health) depend heavily on state and local funding subject to limits on
55. See Story, supra note 42 (reporting the concerns of Hallmark executive Donald J.
Hall).
56. See id. (reporting that officials at dozens of large corporations gave this reason for
pursuing incentives).
57. Id. (quoting Sean O’Byrne, Vice President of the Downtown Council of Kansas
City).
58. Id.
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deficit spending. The 2008 financial crisis and resulting recession
depressed state and local tax revenue, leading to policies of fiscal austerity
in most state and local governments that have particularly harmed the
middle class.
By 2015, for example, almost all states provided less support for higher
education than they had in 2008, typically resulting in higher tuition and
cuts in academic programs at a time when advanced education is especially
important for economic opportunity.59 Similarly, by 2015, the majority of
states provided less funding for K–12 education per student than in 2007,
producing an overall loss of jobs for teachers and other school employees.60
Further, recent federal fiscal policy has exacerbated the pressures on states
to cut education and health programs due to caps on discretionary spending
that have reduced federal support for state and local government programs
to the lowest levels since 1989.61 State and local government spending cuts
targeting public employees also have reduced middle-class jobs and income
security.62
In contrast to popular and expert suspicion of “redistributive” public
subsidies for middle-class or low-income citizens, however, prevailing
ideas about tax subtly help differentiate and legitimize the upward transfers
of “corporate welfare” benefits. Government support for workers and
nonwealthy families is often characterized as “redistribution” imposed by
government fiat based on contested ideas of fairness and equality to the
detriment of overall economic gain. In contrast, these business subsidies
tend to be portrayed as economic development harnessing market forces to
produce overall growth.
That is, extravagant public support for large corporations (and often their
billionaire executives) often has been constructed not as regressive
“redistribution” but as the going market price necessary for successful
participation in a harshly competitive global economy.63 By offering
59. MICHAEL MITCHELL & MICHAEL LEACHMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
YEARS OF CUTS THREATEN TO PUT COLLEGE OUT OF REACH FOR MORE STUDENTS 1 (2015),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/5-13-15sfp.pdf (reporting that the average
state was spending 20 percent less per student in 2014–15 than in 2007–08) [https://
perma.cc/EC6W-QKWK].
60. MICHAEL LEACHMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MOST STATES
HAVE CUT SCHOOL FUNDING, AND SOME CONTINUE CUTTING 1–2 (2016), http://www.cbpp.
org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-10-15sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG8C-G56L].
61. Michael Leachman, Federal Support for Most State and Local Programs Headed to
50-Year Low, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES: BLOG (Sept. 24, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://
www.cbpp.org/blog/federal-support-for-most-state-and-local-programs-headed-to-50-yearlow [https://perma.cc/Y6TQ-FMPS].
62. See DAVID COOPER, MARY GABLE & ALGERNON AUSTIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE
PUBLIC-SECTOR JOBS CRISIS: WOMEN AND AFRICAN AMERICANS HIT HARDEST BY JOB
LOSSES IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2012), http://www.epi.org/files/2012/bp339public-sector-jobs-crisis.pdf (reporting that public employment cuts particularly affect
women and African Americans) [https://perma.cc/DM8P-W65S].
63. See PHILIP MATTERA ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, TAX BREAKS AND INEQUALITY:
ENRICHING BILLIONAIRES AND LOW-ROAD EMPLOYERS IN THE NAME OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
12
(2014),
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/
taxbreaksandinequality.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX4N-7FSD].
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escalating subsidies despite the risk of destructive results and dubious gains,
government leaders (and the voters who support them) can nonetheless
appear to be hard-nosed and responsible leaders accommodating a new
economic reality of scarce, concentrated, and highly mobile capital. But
because the public incentive payments are not bargains granting a
meaningfully enforced right to goods or services in return, this price
operates more like a tax or tribute paid to the corporations out of
dependence on their undemocratic and superior power.
C. Taxes Structured to Cultivate Subordinates, Not Citizens
Some new state and local incentive policies go further to construct
middle-class benefits as a resource to be tapped by government for the
benefit and control of private capital. This section discusses two examples:
first, channeling business subsidies directly through workers’ wages;
second, channeling business subsidies directly through public higher
education.
1. Employee Income Tax Diversion
First, a recent state tax innovation provides for corporations directly to
extract economic development subsidies from middle-class earnings
through diversions from workers’ personal income taxes. A 2012 report by
Good Jobs First (a group advocating for subsidy reform) showed that
sixteen states provided for over 2700 companies to receive some or even all
of the state personal income taxes withheld from their workers’ paychecks
(either by directly appropriating the taxes withheld or by receiving grants or
tax credits keyed to the withheld wages).64 A significant portion of these
tax policies have been implemented since 2009,65 with employers reaping a
total of nearly $700 million annually, directly from their workers’ wages.66
Major national corporations that have been given these direct benefits from
wage taxes include Tyson Foods, Goldman Sachs, Procter & Gamble,
Nissan, and Boeing.67 In 2008, New Mexico used wage withholding as part
of the $130 million state funding package used to attract a solar energy
panel manufacturing facility promoted by predictions it would create
thousands of jobs.68 After less than two years in operation, the German

64. PHILIP MATTERA ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, PAYING TAXES TO THE BOSS: HOW A
GROWING NUMBER OF STATES SUBSIDIZE COMPANIES WITH THE WITHHOLDING TAXES OF
THEIR WORKERS 12–16 (2012), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/
taxestotheboss.pdf (discussing five states with programs extracting 100 percent of workers’
income tax withholdings and many others providing for diversion of over half of tax
withholdings) [https://perma.cc/UQR6-A9P6].
65. Id. at 15–16.
66. Id. at 12.
67. Id. at 17–21.
68. Id. at 18.
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corporate owner closed the plant, keeping about $12 million in state
government grants.69
These personal income diversion policies stem in part from the fact that
large corporations have been so successful in minimizing taxes that state
and local governments are running short on substantial opportunities for
further exemption from state, property, and corporate income taxes.70
Workers’ personal income tax payments therefore have become additional
resources tapped by governments to “buy”—or, more accurately, “donate
to”—private capital controlled by others. In effect, these tax incentives
require workers to finance their own (insecure) jobs out of their own wages
(without ownership or control rights in return), taking the idea of tax
incentives for “self-reliance” much further than the federal tax-favored
savings accounts or earned income tax credits.
In addition, this tax design constructs public spending as an
individualized direct transfer from private employees to private
corporations, seemingly casting aside the role of government as a mediating
public authority. This direct diversion of tax revenue seems to underscore a
popular sense that middle-class citizens only superficially exercise
democratic control over government fiscal policy, given the political
influence of big money and external pressures from the tough global
competition for economic development.
Moreover, this direct tax diversion further lowers expectations that tax
incentives will produce lasting economic growth. Reductions in taxes for
new private business development in theory carry at least the potential for
some degree of offsetting personal tax revenue over the long term from the
jobs created. In contrast, these subsidies are structured to preclude this
indirect gain to public resources, especially because these personal income
tax diversions are often in addition to other tax reductions.
Though individual workers may gain from the wages from subsidized
jobs, with some possible spillover effects boosting sales and property taxes,
their diverted income tax payments will mean income taxes on other
middle-class workers and businesses are strained or increased to cover
existing government programs. Faced with declining tax revenue, stagnant
or declining middle-class income, and pressure to continue to attract capital
with low taxes, governments are likely to respond with spending cuts
especially affecting middle-class workers, including cuts in the public
employment and public employee benefits that have been a major source of
middle-class security and buying power in many communities.

69. Rob Nikolewski, New Mexico Takes Another Stab at a Big Solar Venture,
WATCHDOG.ORG (Apr. 3, 2015), http://watchdog.org/209845/new-mexico-solar-city/ [https://
perma.cc/HJH7-FF4R].
70. DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, THE FINE PRINT: HOW BIG COMPANIES USE “PLAIN ENGLISH”
TO ROB YOU BLIND 236 (2012).
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2. Higher Education As Business Tax Subsidy
A second innovation draws tax support for private economic
development directly from public higher education. Governments have
long promoted public higher education as a means to economic
development, using government funding to support academic institutions,
students, and faculty; to build research facilities; and to create an educated
workforce that can then attract and benefit private businesses.71 In the last
several years, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo has taken this idea to a
new level.
In 2013, the Governor launched a new tax incentive program called
START-UP NY,72 making the state’s public higher education institutions
“tax-free development zones” for qualifying new, expanding, or relocating
high-tech businesses and start-ups (excluding professional services,
hospitality and restaurant industries, retail and wholesale, and energy
production and distribution).73 For business operations in the tax-free
campus zones, the program offers ten years of complete exemption from
state business taxes, sales and use taxes, telecommunications excise taxes,
local commuter taxes, and real estate leasing or transfer taxes.74 In addition
to these business tax benefits, the program exempts personal income of all
new employees for these business operations from individual state taxation
for the first five years, and then for an additional five years this personal
income tax exemption is limited to $200,000 in income for individuals or
$300,000 for taxpayers filing a joint return.75
Program publicity explains that by tying these tax-free zones to academic
institutions, businesses will have access to research facilities and personnel
(including low-cost or free labor from students and perhaps faculty).76 In
turn, the publicity claims that faculty will benefit from opportunities for
research supporting the businesses, and students will benefit from

71. See generally ELIZABETH POPP BERMAN, CREATING THE MARKET UNIVERSITY: HOW
ACADEMIC SCIENCE BECAME AN ECONOMIC ENGINE (2012) (analyzing historical development
of industry-university partnerships such as in biotechnology).
72. The full program name is “SUNY Tax-free Areas to Revitalize and Transform
Upstate NY.” See A New Chapter for New York, SUNY, https://www.suny.edu/impact/
business/start-up-ny/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) (promoting website for the program)
[https://perma.cc/F4JW-XRFR].
73. Press Release, N.Y. State Governor, Governor Cuomo Launches Start-Up NY
Program at International Conference in New York City (Oct. 22, 2013), https://www.
governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-launches-start-ny-program-international-conferencenew-york-city [https://perma.cc/76CN-45FD].
74. 2013 N.Y. A.B. 8113, enacted June 24, 2013, as 2013 N.Y. Laws 68, creates the new
Article 21 of the New York Economic Development Law (codified at N.Y. ECON. DEV. LAW
§§ 430–440 (McKinney 2015), amending N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 39, 39-a, 40, 180, 181, 210,
606, 612, 803, 1119, 1340, 1405 (McKinney 2016)); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420-a
(McKinney 2016).
75. Pay Zero Taxes for 10 Years? Yes, Really, START-UP NY, http://startup.ny.gov/
tax-break-information (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/CR3L-DJ78].
76. What Is START-UP New York?, START-UP NY, http://startup.ny.gov/ (last visited
Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/5PBY-DJHT].
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opportunities for on-campus internships, jobs, and experiential learning.77
The State University of New York (SUNY) highlights the program as an
example of its leadership in “[l]everaging our position as New York’s
premiere driver of economic activity” and “creating an entrepreneurial 21st
century college campus.”78
State policy has combined these new generous subsidies for private
businesses with new sacrifices from SUNY students, faculty, and staff.
Under threats of major layoffs as part of the Governor’s plan to cut $450
million from state workers, SUNY employee unions agreed to several years
of wage freezes (followed by modest raises), increased health insurance
costs, and “deficit reduction” involuntary furlough days.79 The Governor’s
higher education initiatives also have implemented five years of annual
increases in student tuition, with additional increases in fees for some
campuses. Though the tuition increases have been relatively modest, they
hit at a time of recession straining many middle-class and low-income
families, building on twenty years of SUNY tuition increases averaging 6.7
percent annually as state funding has declined.80 Unlike the subsidized
businesses on campus, SUNY workers and students and the private
businesses that serve them on campus will continue to pay income, sales,
and other taxes.
The first year of the START-UP NY program supported seventy-six new
jobs in thirty businesses, only four of which moved from out of state.81
Examples of businesses receiving the benefits included one relocating from
the center of a small village to a local industrial park a mile away and
another, already located next to a campus, which moved to a neighboring
building to qualify.82 Although businesses in the program do include a
number of middle-class entrepreneurs, some of these may not benefit much
from the tax incentives because their business ventures are unlikely to
generate significant revenue or salaries in their initial years.83
77. See, e.g., START-UP New York: A New Chapter for New York, SUNY, SUNY,
https://www.suny.edu/impact/business/start-up-ny/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) (highlighting
benefits to students and faculty as well as to businesses) [https://perma.cc/7XDE-RHWS].
78. Id.
79. Thomas Kaplan, State Employees’ Union Accepts Wage and Benefit Concessions,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/nyregion/stateemployees-union-accepts-wage-and-benefits-concessions.html (reporting the contract
agreement with CSEA, the union representing many SUNY staff) [https://perma.cc/3DTAWW2S]; Rick Karlin, UUP Members Vote ‘Yes’ on Contract, ALBANY TIMES UNION: BLOG
(June 4, 2013, 4:22 PM), http://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/archives/188347/uup-membersvote-yes-on-labor-contract/ (reporting the contract agreement with UUP, the union
representing SUNY faculty and professional staff) [https://perma.cc/L44J-PVM5].
80. Press Release, N.Y. State Governor, Governor Cuomo Signs NY SUNY 2020
Legislation (Aug. 9, 2011), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signsnysuny-2020-legislation [https://perma.cc/Z2HK-98ZC].
81. Susanne Craig & Jesse McKinley, Cuomo’s Job Creation Program Is Slow to Take
Hold, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/15/nyregion/for-76new-jobs-new-york-state-has-spent-tens-of-millions.html [https://perma.cc/3AXB-6WJD].
82. See Mike Hendricks, The Other Side of Start-Up NY, ALBANY BUS. REV. (Jan. 30,
2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/albany/print-edition/2015/01/30/the-other-side-of-startup-ny.html [https://perma.cc/DMH9-W5BF].
83. See Craig & McKinley, supra note 81.
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Adding to concerns about the impact of uncertain economic development
gains and lost tax revenue, the state spent over $45 million in initial
advertising for the program.84 An investigation by the State Comptroller
faulted this expensive marketing effort for its failure to identify goals or
expected outcomes beyond broad and vague references to creating jobs.85
In response, the Chief Executive Officer of the economic development
corporation operating and marketing the program defended its success in
terms of “changed perceptions,” such as showing businesses that the state
“[has] its act together” and is “back in the game.”86
Indeed, this program is evidence that cultural, symbolic, and political
change should be understood as the overarching purpose of tax incentive
policies. New York’s tax-free campus development initiative appears
tailored particularly to change perceptions of the purpose and place of
public higher education and more deeply to change perceptions of
responsible middle-class citizenship and democratic government.
These campus-based tax incentives represent a message that the new
economy requires enhanced public support for private capital development
combined with more personal responsibility for human development.
Reflecting a broader shift in ideology of productivity and dependency, the
SUNY-based tax incentive program positions the selected businesses as
specially deserving of public support. In contrast, students, faculty, and
other workers on campus (and the private campus businesses that serve
them) are treated as especially dependent on the jobs and resources
promised by outside entrepreneurs. As passengers on a more powerful and
important economic engine driven by others, students, faculty, staff, and
their service providers are expected to bear the increased costs and bumps
of that ride as the market price of their position of relative unproductivity.
Consistent with general neoliberal ideology, which idealizes unequal and
undemocratic government economic support, this is a vision where
government takes on the role as business partner, but in a subordinate
position without equal rights to control or to share in gains. The SUNY
program’s message goes further than promoting economic revival through
innovative business entrepreneurship or new technology. That mission is
commonly advanced by direct public spending for academic programs,
student scholarships, research and development, job training programs, or
small business development programs. But by instead rewarding a small
number of firms for affiliating with local academic institutions, and by
giving academic leadership significant power to select, manage, and gain
from those business subsidies, the program signals a step away from ideals
of both academic independence and market independence.
84. THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, MARKETING
SERVICE PERFORMANCE MONITORING: EMPIRE STATE DEVELOPMENT 10–11 (2015) (auditing
this expenditure along with other economic development marketing expenditures).
85. See id. at 44 (commenting on the State Comptroller’s justifications for the
advertising).
86. Craig & McKinley, supra note 81 (quoting Howard Zemsky, owner of a major
Buffalo real estate development company and Chief Executive of Empire State Development
Corporation).
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In a kind of clientele relationship between academic institutions,
businesses, and state political leaders, the campus is charged with
encouraging research and teaching that benefits the specific companies
identified as its partners and with justifying the highly politicized program
by aiding the company’s success. For example, the Governor proposed to
provide salary bonuses to state campus presidents and professors based on
their success in attracting and generating profits for businesses in the
program. However, that proposal was withdrawn after the legislature’s
Higher Education Committee Chair raised concerns about academic
integrity and conflicts of interest.87
The program appears designed to promote a popular impression of
political propaganda and cronyism more than substance, with marketing
tailored more toward promoting the Governor than informing businesses of
the intricate selection criteria and application process. The deeper and
subtler public perception may be to confirm suspicions that economic
success—in higher education as elsewhere—depends less on pursuing hard
work, economic or societal value, and integrity and more on cultivating
relationships likely to bestow favors in exchange for loyalty or docility.
The cultural change produced by these programs, in other words, is less
about producing viable economic growth and more about lowering middleclass expectations for benefiting from economic growth—or even from
democratic political citizenship.
III. CHALLENGING TAX IDEAS OF DEMOCRATIC POWERLESSNESS
To better challenge fiscal policies driving unequal austerity, we must
change two underlying ideas: first, that productivity depends primarily on
private capital and second, that current equal prosperity is limited by
economics, not politics. Instead, the public power to tax and spend is a
fundamental source of economic growth, fundamentally grounded in
political citizenship not private transactions.
These ideas have been impeded by optimal tax theory,88 which “balances
the benefits of redistribution against the inevitable costs of tax-induced
distortions to produce a welfare-maximizing regime.”89 Though real tax
policy bears little resemblance to this theory’s ideal,90 the theory
nonetheless powerfully fuels scholarly and political acceptance of policies
of inequality as sound economics, rather than as elitist interest and
ideology.91 But a more complete economics rejects the idea that tax
“distorts” a naturally “welfare-maximizing,” pre-political economic order
87. Will Brunelle, Cuomo Ties Business Initiative to SUNY Funding, POLITICO N.Y.
(Mar. 4, 2015, 5:40 AM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/albany/2015/03/8563333/
cuomo-ties-business-initiative-suny-funding [https://perma.cc/C3AT-DAVR].
88. See Sugin, supra note 8 (analyzing this theory’s ideas about fairness and justice).
89. Raskolnikov, supra note 10, at 526.
90. Id. (noting the real tax system has “little in common” with optimal tax theory).
91. See Edward J. McCaffery & James R. Hines, Jr., The Last Best Hope for
Progressivity in Tax, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031, 1037 (2010) (noting the influence of the ideas
of optimal tax theory even among liberals).
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driven by free individual preferences, especially because that naturalized
market vision omits an economic analysis of money.92 Modern money
theory explains that political and legal systems for creating, regulating, and
distributing money are fundamental to economic prosperity and stability,
necessarily shaping (not “distorting”) and facilitating private exchanges of
goods and services.93
For governments with substantial control of their own currency—like the
U.S. federal government—this macroeconomics of money shows that the
primary purpose of taxation is not to raise revenue from private production
for public spending.94 Instead, with sovereign power over currency, public
funds can be created “through keystrokes.”95 Although inflation can
potentially limit that power, that risk is far more confined, contextual, and
uncertain than typically assumed by simplified neoclassical economics.
Instead, the economic costs and benefits of public money creation depend
on the contingent, complex value-laden questions of how that money is
spent and invested and how effectively taxes and other forms of regulation
help steer economic and political activity toward the productivity, stability,
and legitimacy that will help maintain currency value. Taxation is
primarily and properly regulatory, not revenue raising.96
With a more accurate understanding of the macroeconomics of tax, we
can see nonwealthy citizens as economically deserving of fiscal policy
skewed in their favor, not as beneficiaries of “redistribution” or as
“consumers” who must struggle to “buy” these favors with their taxes.97
Instead, nonwealthy democratic citizens are potentially collective producers
and owners of overall economic well-being, equally capable of and entitled
to use the productive power of government for their benefit. The inherently
public and political power to produce and control currency means that
government can stimulate, lead, and regulate economic production without
being dependent primarily on satisfying the demands of private capital.
Using tax policies to benefit particular social goals and to advance
equality is not “redistribution” that deviates from normal or normative
private economic maximizing, but rather reflects the core power of taxation
92. For a leading resource on the economics of money, see L. RANDALL WRAY, MODERN
MONEY THEORY: A PRIMER ON MACROECONOMICS FOR SOVEREIGN MONETARY SYSTEMS
(2012). See also MODERN MONEY NETWORK, http://www.modernmoneynetwork.org (last
visited Apr. 29, 2016) (providing resources integrating this economics with legal analysis)
[https://perma.cc/XG3N-SZRV].
93. See CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF
CAPITALISM (2014) (analyzing the historical role of money in creating and directing
markets).
94. L. Randall Wray, MMP Blog #31: Functional Finance: Monetary and Fiscal
Policy for Sovereign Currencies, NEW ECON. PERSP.: BLOG (Jan. 8, 2012), http://
neweconomicperspectives.org/2012/01/mmp-blog-31-functional-finance-monetary.html
(giving an overview of the economic principles) [https://perma.cc/W7FK-HUT7].
95. Id.
96. L. Randall Wray, A Meme for Money, Part 4: The Alternative Tax Meme, NEW
ECON. PERSP.: BLOG (Dec. 6, 2012), http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2012/12/a-memefor-money-part-4-the-alternative-tax-meme.html [https://perma.cc/2QDQ-AS6P].
97. See supra Part I (discussing current tax ideas of the middle-class responsibility for
limited consumption and redistribution).
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to direct the economy toward particular, inevitably contested, visions of
economic well-being. Similarly, disproportionate taxes on the wealthy do
not risk “distorting” otherwise normal and natural production, but rather can
redirect economic production toward broader, fairer, and more sustainable
economic growth and more stable, legitimate, and fair politics (for example,
controlling the oligarchic political power of extreme wealth). Further, tax
incentives can better enhance middle-class security not by rewarding
individualized earning and saving subject to control of private capital, but
by recognizing the greater economic power and security that is possible
when middle-class citizens act collectively through government.
Repositioned as productive drivers of economic growth, ordinary workers
and taxpayers can better claim legitimate authority to ensure ample
government support for the infrastructure, health and education, social
insurance, regulatory systems, and high-waged, environmentally sustainable
jobs that will better enable and protect their private income and assets.98
State and local governments (like many nations) that lack the public
fiscal power derived from sovereign currency can nonetheless develop legal
institutions to reduce public dependency on mobile private capital. In the
United States, the recent austerity, deindustrialization, and job losses facing
state and local governments could be alleviated by federal spending creating
capital for state and local governments to use for economic and social
development. Along with providing an alternative supply of job-creating
capital, state and local governments could better ensure broad public
benefits from private capital through federal law restricting location-based
corporate subsidies as discriminatory interstate trade barriers, as the
European Union has done to a significant extent.99
CONCLUSION
The middle class’s dependency on elite private capital for economic
development and security is caused by politics and ideology, not by natural
or inevitable economic constraints. The collective fiscal and monetary
power of the U.S. federal government is constituted by “we the people,”
and it can be used to increase opportunity and security broadly if that policy
is under democratic control of citizens. For that power to be realized, we
need a different tax story that makes public support for the economic and
social well-being of the vast majority of citizens the benchmark for
reasonable and responsible tax policy, not a presumptively unproductive
“distortion.”

98. See, e.g., Raúl Carrillo, Your Government Owes You a Job, NATION (Apr. 23, 2014),
http://www.thenation.com/article/your-government-owes-you-job/ (explaining that the
United States has economic power to use public spending for full employment)
[https://perma.cc/32ZY-Q3YF].
99. For an insightful analysis of European approaches to regulating these economic
development subsidies and possible alternatives for U.S. law reform, see Tracy A. Kaye, The
Gentle Art of Corporate Seduction: Tax Incentives in the United States and the European
Union, 57 KAN. L. REV. 93, 100–44 (2008).

